/ / * E-O * SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

ACTION: EA/J (299) INFO: DCEA/OPE, EYESONLY, MDSX, ODPD, FILE, C/EA, DDO, EA/XO (4/W)

96 3620327 ASO PAGE 001 IN 3620327
TOR: 260842Z MAR 96 TOKY 24344

S E C R E T 260832Z MAR 96 STAFF

CITE TOKYO 24344

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR.

FOR: LIMIT C/EA/J INFO CHIEF/EA, DCEA/OPE, EA/XO

SLUGS: WNINTEL

SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - FOR C/EA/J - OFFICIAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF TOKYO STATION

REF: DIRECTOR 700784 96 3598980

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: PLEASE INCORPORATE THE FOLLOWING INTO THE *TALKING POINTS TO BE USED IN THE PRESENTATION TO THE<JFK> *<ASSASSINATION>RECORDS REVIEW BOARD.

2. AMBASSADOR MONDALE, THE EMBASSY AND THE STATION STRONGLY OPPOSE RELEASE TO THE PUBLIC OF ANY REFERENCE TO THE EXISTENCE OF A CIA STATION IN JAPAN. SUCH ACTION COULD HAVE ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES FOR US-JAPAN RELATIONS AT A TIME WHEN A NUMBER OF DIFFICULT SECURITY AND ECONOMIC ISSUES REMAIN UNRESOLVED. IT ALSO WOULD RISK REIGNITING EARLIER CONTROVERSIES OVER ALLEGED CIA WIRETAPPING OF THE MAN WHO IS TODAY THE PRIME MINISTER AND OVER PAST CIA FUNDING FOR THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY. PUBLIC CONFIRMATION WOULD, WITHOUT A DOUBT, DISRUPT COOPERATION WITH JAPANESE LIAISON SERVICES ON IMPORTANT COUNTERTERRORIST AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CASES. BY MAKING THE STATION THE OBJECT OF GREATER PUBLIC AND POSSIBLY OFFICIAL SCRUTINY, IT WOULD LOWER THE CONFIDENCE OF EXISTING AND NEW SOURCES IN OUR ABILITY TO PROTECT THEIR IDENTITY AND SECURITY.

3. IMPACT ON US-JAPAN RELATIONS: THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT PUBLICLY ADMIT THAT IT COLLECTS INTELLIGENCE, AND AS A COROLLARY, DOES NOT ADMIT TO HAVING LIAISON RELATIONSHIPS WITH US INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES. TOKYO AVOIDS PUBLIC ACKNOWLEDGEMENT BECAUSE IT KNOWS THAT INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION IS ANATHEMA TO THE LEFT WING OF THE JAPANESE POLITICAL SPECTRUM, AND ANY ADMISSION WOULD GIVE THE LEFT NEW OPPORTUNITIES TO ATTACK THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY, WHICH WAS THE RULING PARTY FROM 1955 TO 1993 AND IS TODAY THE PARTY OF THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE LEADING PARTY WITHIN THE RULING COALITION. ANY OFFICIAL CONFIRMATION THAT CONTRADICTED EARLIER JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

DENIALS OF CIA PRESENCE IN JAPAN WOULD BE USED AS A CLUB BY THE LEFT TO ATTACK LDP SUPPORT FOR THE US-JAPAN MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY AND THE PRESENCE OF US FORCES IN JAPAN. WITH A STATE VISIT BY THE US PRESIDENT FAST APPROACHING AND DELICATE NEGOTIATIONS OVER US BASES IN OKINAWA LIKELY TO CONTINUE INTO 1997, THIS WOULD BE A PARTICULARLY BAD TIME TO OPEN THE DOOR TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS ABOUT US ACTIVITIES AND INTENTIONS IN JAPAN.

4. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF CIA PRESENCE WOULD ALSO REVIVE OLD CONTROVERSIES THAT HAVE LARGELY RECEDED FROM THE HEADLINES. IN 1995, THE PRESS MADE A MAJOR ISSUE OF CIA FUNDING FOR THE LDP IN ITS FORMATIVE YEARS. ANYTHING THAT LENT CREDIBILITY TO THE STORY WOULD BE A SERIOUS POLITICAL LIABILITY FOR THE LDP. THEN FOREIGN MINISTER AND LDP PRESIDENT KONO YOHEI PERSONALLY ASKED AMBASSADOR MONDALE THAT THE US GOVERNMENT NOT RELEASE DOCUMENTS ON THIS SUBJECT. KONO EXPLAINED TO AMBASSADOR MONDALE THAT THE LDP CAN DEAL WITH RUMORS AND EVEN UNCONFIRMED LEAKS, BUT OFFICIAL CONFIRMATION OF CIA ACTIVITY IN JAPAN WOULD BE AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT AFFAIR, THREATENING TO DAMAGE BOTH THE CONSERVATIVE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AS WELL AS THE US-JAPAN SECURITY RELATIONSHIP. KONO EXPLICITLY IMPRESSED ON THE AMBASSADOR THE NEED FOR THE US GOVERNMENT TO HOLD THE LINE AGAINST DISCLOSURE.

5. IN THE FALL OF 1995, A NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLE ALLEGED THAT THE CIA HAD WIRETAPPED HASHIMOTO RYUTARO, WHO HAS SINCE BECOME PRIME MINISTER. IN RESPONSE TO THE ENSUING PRESS QUERIES, JAPANESE OFFICIALS OF THE CONCERNED MINISTRY DISMISSED THE STORY AS IMPLAUSIBLE. IF THE US GOVERNMENT DECLASSIFIES A DOCUMENT THAT CONFIRMS CIA PRESENCE IN JAPAN, IT WOULD HAND THE JAPANESE PRESS NEW OPPORTUNITIES TO REOPEN THE ISSUE OF ALLEGED ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE AND ATTACK THE UNITED STATES AND ITS FRIENDS WITHIN THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT.

6. DISRUPTION OF LIAISON RELATIONSHIPS: THE JAPANESE SERVICES GO TO GREAT LENGTHS TO KEEP THEIR RELATIONSHIPS WITH US INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES SECRET. IN THE CASE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT OF THOSE RELATIONSHIPS, ALL CONTACT COULD BE SEVERED IN THE EVENT OF DISCLOSURE AND EMBARRASSMENT. SUCH A RUPTURE IN THE RELATIONSHIP DEFIES EASY REPAIR. THE SOUTH KOREAN AGENCY FOR NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING, WHICH SERIOUSLY EMBARRASSED JAPANESE LIAISON WHEN IT KIDNAPPED OPPOSITION POLITICIAN KIM DAE JUNG FROM TOKYO OVER TWO DECADES AGO, IS STILL TREATED AS A PARIAH TODAY.

7. IMPACT ON CONTINUING OPERATIONS: OUR ONGOING COOPERATION WITH A JAPANESE LIAISON SERVICE IN PURSUIT OF A MAJOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST GROUP COULD BE TOTALLY DISRUPTED BY DISCLOSURE. EXTREMELY IMPORTANT US LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLIGENCE EQUITIES ARE AT STAKE IN THIS COOPERATIVE ENDEAVOR. THE TERRORIST GROUP IS PROBABLY NOT AWARE OF THE EXTENT OF US INVOLVEMENT IN THEIR PURSUIT. DISCLOSURE THAT REMINDED THEM OF THE POSSIBILITY OF US-JAPANESE COOPERATION AGAINST THEM COULD BE DETRIMENTAL TO OUR ABILITY TO COLLECT INTELLIGENCE ON THE GROUP.

8. IMPACT ON SOURCES: STATION'S RELATIONSHIP WITH AT LEAST ONE *SOURCE PREDATES THE<JFK ASSASSINATION.> PUBLICITY ABOUT CIA PRESENCE AND ACTIVITY, EVEN IN THE PAST, OFTEN CAUSES SOURCES TO WONDER ABOUT

OUR ABILITY TO PROTECT THEIR SECURITY. OLDER SOURCES, NOT SURPRISINGLY, SEE EVEN PUBLICITY ABOUT THE PAST AS SOMETHING THAT COULD FOCUS ATTENTION ON THEM AS INDIVIDUALS.

9. CL REASON: 1.5 (C); DECL ON: X1.

10. FILE: NONE. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET